"If I had known then what I know now about the weapons of mass destruction, which was a key reason that I voted to go in there, I would not vote to go into Iraq the way we did," Senator Hutchison said. She went on to add, "We had intelligence that we relied on."

Radnofsky: "My opponent did not disclose that, in October of 2002, she was warned from the floor of the senate that classified information existed and was available to her that WMD intelligence was faulty.

"Specifically Sen. Bob Graham warned his colleagues about what he described in 'Intelligence Matters' as the 'CIA's honest, still classified assessment of what would happen if we were to invade Iraq.'"

(This press release references only publicly available information describing classified versus non-classified matters, available in the discs of the Random House 2004 recording of a verbal version of Senator Bob Graham's book "Intelligence Matters," which include Sen. Graham's knowledge and recommendations concerning information and the leadership necessary to wage war on terror.)

"Friends, I encourage you to read the classified intelligence reports which are much sharper than what is available in declassified form," Sen. Graham said in October 2002 as the senate considered his amendment to the Iraqi war resolution.

"We are going to be increasing the threat level against the people of the United States."

In an extraordinary choice of words, he said, "Blood is going to be on your hands."

What publicly available information do we have as to the content of the classified data concerning WMD?

We know that Senator Graham asked for a national intelligence estimate in September, 2002 as to the war in Iraq, and was informed by George Tenet than none had previously been requested. The senators ended up receiving an NIE as to the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the very question Senator Hutchison revealed in her answer in our debate October 19, 2006 as the key element in her decison to vote for war.

We know, pre-Iraqi War Resolution, that the CIA produced a classified 90-page document, and that Sen. Graham has stated that the classified version did not support the later claim by George Tenet that the WMD issue was a "slam dunk." We know that the classified data in the 90-page NIE, "undermined many arguments" for war, according to Sen. Graham.

When Graham requested a declassification of the 90-page document, the CIA immediately produced a slick, 25-page document with production values exceeding the 90-page NIE. Graham has explained that the 25-page document didn't accurately represent the classified NIE. He said that gone were the assessments of Saddam Hussein's intentions to use WMD, omitting "a huge component" selectively removed. And Graham has said the slick 25-page document was "substantially different" from the classified document, and selectively put forth risks in favor of invading, while omitting other key information.

The publicly available 25-page document on Iraq and WMD was not a "version" of the 90-page document, according to Graham. There were two different messages, Graham has said, and he "was livid." He complained to George Tenet of the "wildly different impressions" created by the two documents, and sought declassification. We know he had some limited effect but that the secret document contained much more.

Radnofsky: "Senator Hutchison referenced a very recent NIE in her debate, and compared public versus classified information. We know therefore she has access to such documents. She should have read the NIE on WMD, which, according to Sen. Graham's book, demonstrated that Saddam Hussein was not going to attack us unless we attacked him. He reveals the far greater terror risks disclosed then, in his proposal being debated: from Al-Qaeda, Abu Nidal, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Liberation Front, and Hezbollah. And, he explains the order of priority in finishing the job in Afghanistan, and General Franks's honest assessment of where the war on terror needed to be fought, from February of 2002: Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. General Franks disclosed that the intelligence on WMD in Iraq was 'weak.'

"My opponent should have done her homework on WMD intelligence, since that intelligence is what she referenced just days ago as her critical decision-making factor in going to war in Iraq."